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NCN.iNTIil=ST BANKING IN
NATIONAL TCONOMIC DEVEI.OPMENT

THE RCLE OT

Hence, for these roles, the bonk
becomes on importont finonciol
institution for enhoncing growth
ond developmentin on economy

Soint Poul (1992) olso identifies
onotherlink between finonce ond
growth is through technologicol
choice. With his theoreticol

sections, the first section contoins
the introduction, section 2 hos the

underdeveloped finonciol morket
con leod to ogents investing in less
speciolized industries. He then
concludes thot this con leod to

The poper is divided into five

conceptuolfromework, section

-

three gives non-interest bonking
in Nigerio ond section four

MOBOLAJI, llokeem Isholo {PhDl
De portmenf of Economics,
University of llorin, llorin
Kworo Slole
INTRODUCTION

I

A
A

institution thot mobilizes
\sovings ond chonnels

multiple equilibrio, o low

concludes the poper.

equilibrium with underdeveloped

2.0

tronsmission mechonism between

unspeciolized technology ond o
high equilibrium with developed
finonciol morkets with speciolized
technology.

bonks ond development, interest
rote

According

CONCTPTUALTRAM-WORK

This section discusses the

2.1

bonk is ony finonciol

model, he shows thot

TRANSMISSION MECHANISM

BETWEEN BANKS AND
DEVELOPMENT

finonciol

morkets ond

to Ang (2008) two
chonnels through which finonce
con influence growth ore the
copitol occumulotion ond the

totol foctor productivity

(olso

known os the quontitotive ond

to productive units. ln Goldsmith {.1969lr, Mckinnon 1973, quolitotive chonnels,
ond Show (19731suggest thot the respectively). The former suggesfs
bonks perform three chonnel of tronsmission of thot economic growth depends

some

dischorging these functions, the
tronsformotions, Risk, liquidity ond

moturity tronsformotions. Risk
tronsformotion in terms of
providing o sofety net for surplus
unit, ond thus hedges depositors
ogoinst ony potentiol security risk,
such os theft, fire etc. lt ensures
liquidity tronsformotion, through
reduction of seorch cost for o
potentiolborrower, thus, the bonk
provides on occess to credit
f

ocility, ond thus provides

o

consumption smoothing ogoinst
income shock of o deficit unit or
borrower. lt performs the moturity
tronsformotion by guoronteeing
both the sover ond bonower of
immediote fund when it is needed,
more so, thot often borrowers wont
to bonow for long period ond
lenders only wont to lend for short
period, the bonks guorontee both
porties of theirfund ot the period of
moturity orwhen they need it. Thus,
octs os on investment smootherfor
long term development projects.

bonking system to growth is
through the efficiency of

on copitol occumulotion through

intermediories os processor of
informotion by directing the flow
of on economy's resources toword

mobilize sovings ond chonnel it to

investment. Greenwood ond
Jovonovic (1990) view finonciol

domestic credit ond foreign
copitol investment. An efficient
finonciol system is needed to
productive ventures. The lotter
thot efficient finonciol

suggests

investment with the highest return.

system boosts economic

Bencinvengo ond Smith (1991),
show thot the potentiol economic

development through provision of
credit focilities to focilitote humon

benefit of finonciol intermediotion

is only in the monner in which
finonciol intermediories ollocote

copitol occumulotion ond
development of technologyintensive industries.

sovings.

Levine (1997) orgues thot the
moin tronsmission of finonciol

octivity

to economic

development is through the foct
thot finonciol system improves risk
reduction, focilitotes efficient
resource ollocotion, enhonces
occess to finonciolinformotion on
investments, increoses soving

mobilizotion ond monitors

controct complionce.

''Heis thepioneerchoirmonof AlBorokohMicrofinonce bonkot67, Lodposfreet, Logos

t7

Finonciol intermediories enhonce
investment ond growth through its
informotionol role (Greenwood
ond Jovonovic 1990). Sovings ore
ollocoted more efficiently; hence

higher productivity of copitol

is

possible lhrough finonciol

intermediories. The risk-shoring
role of finonciol intermediories
olso ollows them to pool the
liquidity risk of depositors ond
invest funds in more illiquid ond

productive projects (Diomond
ond Dybvig, 1983) Levine (2004).

good finonciol institution
impocts positively on economic
development through enhoncing
ln short, o

domestic sovings, focilitoting
productive investments ond
efficient resource ollocotion.
Other chonnels include improving
ocquisition of technology ond

enhoncing humon copitol
occumulotion while reducing
informotion, enforcement ond

morolly ond religious detestoble,
unfortunotely there seems to be
is

no generolly occeptoble

rotionole for imposition of interest
rote in the literoture or it is simply
inconclusive in the literoture.

2.2

lnlerest Rs'e: A controversiol
r3oncept in Economics

century, there wos o resurgence of
the coll to zero interest rote (see
Schumpeter 1934)". This concept

remoins inconclusive

in

the

literoture. Persky (2007l, concludes
thot the controversiol concept is o
modest dispute between o foiling
moster (Smith died in 1790) ond on

over-eoger disciple (Jeremy
Benthom)

The origins of "interest" ore

deeply

connected to the chonging

Some Economists (Clossicol)

meoning of "usury." Conon low in

rotionolize interest rote on the bosis

it

tronsoction cost. Thus, finonciol
institutions oct os o cotolyst for

the Middle Ages forbode usury,

of

which wos generolly interpreted
os o loon repoyment exceeding

considered os o compensotion for
woiting ordeloyed consumption or

(See

the principolomount. The modern
word "interest" derives from the

socrifice of sovers, Keynession
rotionolize it on time preference

Medievol Lotin interesse.

theory of money, suggesting thot o
rotionol economic ogent prefers
the present to the future, thus he
needs to be compensoted for

economic development
Moboloji

20 I 0 for

further detoils)

However, the woy the
conventionol bonking institutions
hove ottempted to perform these
functions hos been o serious
source of concern, since it is
premised on the institution of
interest rote which is less humone
in outlook ond exploitotive in
proctice. This hos led to finonciol
exclusion, low finonciol depth ond
poor occess to finonciol services
with its ottendont negotive

impocts on the economic
development of severol
countries''.

Honohon (2008) observes thot, not
only is "Africo the region in which
finonce looms lorgest, but in Africo
finonce is the number one borrier".
He further observes thot ofter o
decode of finonciol reforms,

finonciol sector development in
AFRICA is still constroined by four
pervosive chollenges: lock of
scole economies, dominonce of
the informol sector, governonce
problem ond scole shocks to the
system.

One of the most

controversiol
the conventionol proctice
is the institution of interest rote. The
issues in

imposition

of interest rote hos

further worsened finonciol

exclusion on two boses, one it is
highly exploitotive ond secondly it

The
Oxford English Dictionory exploins

thot interesse originolly meont o
penolty for the defoult on or lote
poyment of on otherwise
legitimote, non-usurious loon. As
more sophisticoted commerciol
ond finonciol proctices spreod
through Europe. Over time,
"interest" become the generic
term for oll legitimote ond
occepted poyments on loons.
concept of interest rote which
hos undergone severol stoges in
contemporory economic thinking,
storted in eorly l6th century with
wide condemnotion, to the ero of
Adom smith with o moximum rote
of 5%, to l8th century position of
The

Jeremy Benthom of totol

eliminotion of interest rote ceiling.
ll olso storted with mony stotes
restricting it on loons between
persons ond corporotions, others
out rightly condemn it, but now it
hos been defined os o rentol
income of money.
The concept of interest rote hos
gone through four stoges, storting

with o stoge of wide

condemnotion from eorly to 17th
centuries, to o stoge of restrictive
permission in the lote 18th century.
This loter become o bosis for
finoncioltronsoctions in the I 9th to
2lst century, ond in the lote 2lst

obstinence theory, os

is

discounting his future holding,

hence it is o compensotion to the
lender ond impotient cost to the
borrower. However, these positions
hove been foulted by Siddiqi
(1978), suggesting thot this position
suggests thot there is no existence
of o voluntory sector, where
individuols odvonce o good
without onticipoting o reciprocol

benefit. Housmonn ond
Mocpherson (2000) optly
demonstrote thot individuols
engoge in so mony economic

octivities not for their pecuniory
interest only but for other sociol
ond personol considerotions
(exomple people donote blood
not for moteriol benefit but for
other considerotions).
From

o

religious perspective, the

of interest ond its
opplicotion on finonciol

institution

tronsoction is condemned in both
Christionity ond lslom. References
to this in the Bible include Luke 6:3435; Levictus 25:36-37, Exodus
25:25). The verses in the Qu'ron
thot support some include Q30:39;
Q4:l6l;Q3:130 ond then Q2:275278. However, the Jewish os shown
in Deuteronomy 23:19-23 thot
mildly ollows for discriminotory

Iheresu/fs of the EFIIA Access fo Fhonciolservrces in Nigerio20l0 surveyshowed lhol39.2 miltionNigerionsrepresen hng 46.3%of the odutt
populationorefinonciolly exc/uded. Only25.4millionNigeionsorebonkedrepresenfing30.0%of theodultpoputofion. Themoinboilers
for finonciol exc/usion inc/udes unemploymenl ond distonce to bonk bronches, some Muslims ore o/so exc/uded from occessing
conventionolinleresf-bosedbonkinginstitutionsrnobservonceoffheprohibitionogoinstRibo
(Bosheer,2,ll)
'o
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proctice, suggesting it con be
imposed on commerciol
tronsoctions involving non-Jews,
ond this hos received world
condemnotion.

2.3

The conventionol prociice
qnd iis otiendcnl eflecis in
th* economy
Due to the obove, this section
briefly outlines some economic

rotionole for the obolition of

the finol consumer through high
prices, especiolly when the
products ore foirly inelostic. One
of the most criticol problems of
interest rote is thot it imposes
uniloterol risk on the customer or
borrower ond sometimes through
this, strongulotes entrepreneurship

ond stiffens innovotion. ln controst
to the NlB, where risks ore mutuolly

shored by the porties

involved.(See Glossory for
meoning of some of the finoncing
modes ovoiloble).

interest rote:
The clossicol economists contend

thot interest enhonces sovings but
discouroges investment (lS), Hicks
1933 orgues thot there is on inverse
relotionship between investment
ond interest rote, ond there is
positive relotionship between
investment ond economic growth
or development. Thus, while, high

As eorlier stressed, one of the
chonnels by which finonciol
institution enhonces development
is through funding of low-return but

sociolly relevont projects,

however the institution of interest
rote discouroges this, os the low
return moy not be odequote to

interest rote discouroges wipe the interest-cost element
investment ond thus, lowers ond other incidentol costs.

economic growth ond
development. Though, the theory
suggests high ond direct
relotionship between interest rote
ond sovings, however, in mony
developing countries in generol,
ond in Nigerio in porticulor, thot
interest rote elosticity to sovings is
zero, suggestlng mony sovers do
not sove becouse of interest rote
but for other reosons (See The
TATOO

debote

At lndividuol level, it moy further
worsen finonciol exclusion, lost of
self-esteem ond freedom, due to
high debt profile. At firm's level, it
moy increose cost of production,
reduce copocity utilizotion ond

discouroge investment. At
notionol level, interest rote moy

worsen both internol ond externol

debt burden. At

internotionol

level, it moy leod to unequoltrode

1973-4).

lmposition of lnterest rote on
consumption loon moy further
worsen income inequolity, os it
moy tronsfer weolth from the
deficit unit (borrower who
eventuolly poys the principol ond

vulneroble to externol

monipulotions (especiolly of the
donor or funding ogencies).

who eorn income from

occumuloted weolth (eorns

simply declores stobility

interest on fixed deposit).

inherently unsustoinoble.

lnterest poid on loon is considered
os o cost of copitol, ond thus, for o
firm it is regorded os on increose in

Thus,

unit (sover, who receives his
principol omount soved

plus

interest income). lt moy olso
creote on idle closs of people,

i

brooden finonciol depth in

i

country

the

|

2.4 THT CONCEPI

OT

ECONOMIC DEVELOPf,NENT

Thirwoll (2005) defines economic
development os the process of

economic

ond sociol

tronsformotion within countries.
This process often follows o wellordered sequence ond exhibits
common chorocteristics ocross
countries. Previously, it connotes
growth torget with little regord to
the beneficiories of growth or the
composition of output. However, it
is obvious thot, societies ore not
indifferent to the distribution

consequences

of

economic

policy. Thus, loter scholors orgue
thot o concept of development is
required thot embroces the mojor
economic ond sociol objectives
ond volues thot societies strive for.
Sen, (1999) defined development

in terms of the

exponsion of
entitlements ond copobilities. He
defines entitlements os 'the set of
olternotive commodity bundles
thot o person con commond in o
society using the totolity of rights
ond obligotions thot he or she
foces ond entitlements generote
the copobility to do certoin things.

relotions; moke some economies

(1 991 ) considered finonciol
instobility to be endogenous to
conventionol finonciol system. This
is premised on the foct thot the
morket is chorocterized by
osymmetry informotion. His core
model is known os finonciol
instobility hypothesis (FlH), which

the interest element) to the surplus

enhonce f inonciol inclusion,

Minsky

is

Goulet (1971) distinguishes 3
core volues or bosic components
of developmeni (Life-sustenonce,
self-esteem ond Freedom. Life
sustenonce focuses on the
provision of bosic needs. No
country is considered developed
if it connot provide its entire
Thus,

people with bosic needs os
housing, clothing, f ood ond
minimol educotion. Thus, the
objective of development is to
roise people out of primory
poverty ond to provide bosic
needs simultoneously.

cost of production, which

sometime could be tronsfened to

due to these foctors, mony
economists octuolly coll for zero
interest rote. Hence non interest
finonciol institution is octuolly o
veritoble olternotive. lt would

"For o detoiled onolysis on the metomorphosis of interesf rotes, (see Persky,2007)
19

Self esteem is ossocioted with self-

respect ond independence. No
country is developed if it does not
hove power ond influence to

conduct relotions on equol terms.

Erodicotion of feeling of
dominonce ond dependence
ossocioted with inferior economic
ond politicolstotus. Also Freedom
from 3 evils of "Wont, lgnoronce
ond Squolor" People ore not free
until they con freely exercise the

right

to

choose. Thus, moteriol

development enhonces the
ronge of humon choice open to
individuols ond societies. These
three volues ore inter-reloted,
such thol lock of self-esteem ond
freedom result from low levels of
life sustenonce which oll leod to

self-perpetuoting choin of
poverty or Golbroith (1980)
occommodotion of poverty. Sen
(19991 views freedom os the

primory objective of
development ond principol
meons of ochieving
development. Development

consists of the removol of vorious
types of unfreedom thot leove
people with little choice ond
opportunity. Mojor cotegories of
'unfreedom' include fomine,
under nourishment, poor heolth
ond lock of bosic needs, lock of
politicol liberty ond bosic civil
rights, ond the reol freedom thot
people enjoy. Hence, the growth
of per copito income is only o
meons to thot end ond not on

end itself.
Thirwoll, combined Goulet's ond

of development,
by observing thot development
occurs when there hos been on
improvement in bosic needs,
when economic progress hos
contributed to greoter sense of
self-esteem for the country ond
individuols within it, ond when
Sen's concepts

moteriol odvoncement hos
exponded people's entitlements,

copobilities ond freedom.

However, most ingredients of

development

ore not

meosuroble; thus, condition of
being developed is os much o
stote of mind ond not physicol

condition meosuroble

by

economic indices olone.
Thirwoll (2006) further orgues thot
economic development should

be thought of in terms of the
exponsion of entitlements ond
copobilities thot ore not well
coptured by oggregote meosures
of outputgrowth.
Todoro ond Smith (2003), strongly
orgues, thot economics needs to
be viewed in the much brooder
perspective of the overoll sociol
system of o country (which
Includes volues, beliefs, ottitudes
towords effort, risk toking, religion

ond the closs system), if

development mistokes of the post
ore to be ovoided thol stem from
implementing policy bosed on
economic theoryolone.

From the obove, the conventionol

bonking proctice moy only restrict
choice ond entitlement, whereos
the promotion of NIB would
enhonce finonciol choice ond
inclusion, needed for economic
development. lt moy olso promote
development through reduction in
cost of finonciol tronsoction. Thus,
Chopro (2009) observes thot the
globol crisls witnessed such o
tremendous dimension, due to the
level of frogility ond instobility in the
conventionol bonking proctices.
This instobility hos been coused by
incessont finonciol engineering,
excessive speculotion ond obuse

of free morket syndrome. (See

Trumon 2009). This then colled for
Thus, it

con be observed thot the

concept of development hos
undergone dif f erent stoges,

ronging from seeing development
os purely on economic concept
to the stoge of seeing it os o
complex interoction of humon
volues, sociol ond politicol system.
Hence this comprehensive notion
of development moy be difficult
to simply meosure in terms of
economic vorioble(s). Though,

economists often use the

economic meosure of growth
(Reol GDP growth rote) or reol

the need for on olternotive
romework, the non-interest
f

bonking ond its impoct on notionol
economic development. Moreso,
thot the lslomic Finonciol services
lndustry hos proven relotively

resilient compored to

its

conventionol counterport during
the globol finonciol crisis (Sonusi,
20r 0).

3.0

Non-interest Bonking (NlB)
in Nigerio

3.'I

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF

copito
os indicotors for growth ond
development however this hos
been orgued to be inoppropriote
(Thirwoll 2006l'. ln conclusion,

The non-interest bonking is ony
finonciol institution thot exercises
bonking proctices without the

multidimensionol process

other bosed on othervolues.

Gross Notionol lncome per

NIB IN NIGERIA

Todoro (2003) orgues thot institution of interest rote. There ore
development is not purely on two types, non-interest bonk
economic phenomenon, but o occording to lslomic volues, ond
involving the re-orgonizotion ond
re-orientotion of entire economic
ond sociolsystem.

Furthermore, mony notionol
economic development gools ore
to promote freedom, enhonce

The first modern experiment with
non interest bonking con be
troced to the estoblishment of the
Mit Ghomr Sovings Bonk in Egypt in

1963. During the post f our
decodes, however, non-interest

choice, entitlement ond
copobilities ond restore selfesteem ond dignity in personol,
sociol ond economic relotions

bonking hos grown ropidly in terms
of size ond the number of ployers.
Non- interest bonking is cunently

both of notionolond internotionol
level. Any system thot foils to olign
with these gools moy only leod to

countries worldwide especiolly in
the Middle Eost.ln August 2004,the
lslomic Bonk of Britoin become the
first bonk licensed by o non-Muslim
country to engoge in non-interest
bonking. The HSBC, University Bonk

sub-optimol
development.

20

notionol

procticed in more thon

50

'"-

l

j,,,1'
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in Ann Arbor ond Devon Bonk in
Chicogo offer lslomic bonking

products in the United Stotes.
Sonusi (2010) observes thot recent
industry estimotes show thot non
interest Bonking is growing ot o
rote of 10-15% per yeor ond with
signs of consistent future growth

Poldermons ond Philippe (2008)
observe thot the ideol finonciol
sector should disploy of leost six
core desiroble feotures in line with

World Trode Orgonizotion
definition of o finonciol sector.
These ore finonciol depth,
finonciol breodth; finonciol
efficiency; finonciol effectiveness;

Though NIB evolved in the lote 50s
ond mid 1970s in the Middle Eost, it
however commenced to Nigerio

regulotory sophisticotion ond

in 1991, with the promulgotion of
Decree 25,1991 of Bonking ond

development.

other Finonciol lnstitutions Decree
(BOFID), of ter I 00 yeors of

conventionol interest-bosed

bonking system which storted in
1892. The BOFID ollows the setting
up of bonks on the bosis of profit
ond loss shoring mode with o
minimum poid up shore copitol
of N50 milllon. However, 20 yeors
loter, the NIB is yet to be fully
operotionolised. Though, the
fromeworkfor the NIB wos in 2009,
through professor Soludo, the
then CBN Governor. Though, o
number of ottempts were mode,

such os Hobib Nigerion

Bonk
limited (now Bonk PHB Plc) wos
licensed in 1992 lo offer noninterest bonking services on o

"window bosis" but octuolly
commenced operotions in 1999.
Joiz lnternotionol bonk plc wos
licensed in 2004, the bonk wos

gronted opprovolin principle, but
could not commence operotion
before the recopitolizotion of
bonks in 2005, which chonged
the required minimum copitol
bose to N25.0 billion from N2billion
in 2OO4. Fokiyesi (201I ) observes

thot the first full-fledged Non-

interest microfinonce bonk AlBorokoh microfinonce in Logos.
Recently, Joiz bonk, Stondord
Chortered ond Stonbic IBTC bonks
hove been given license to
commence operotion of NIB in the
country.

3.2 Non-lnterest

Bonk (NlB) ond

Developmenl
3.2.1

Non-lnlerestBonk(NlB):

A

o cotolyst for growth

ond

irDi=^,13Ee 2(l

sofe, stoble ond well reguloted
finonciolinstitution thot meetsthe
regulotory sophisticotion criterion.
The groduol growth of NIB in mony

Muslim ond Non-Muslim countries
suggest thot the institution hos o
progressive poth ond o sustoinoble
finonciollife cycle.
The benchmork for finonciol depth
occording to the outhors is 200-600

bonks per

thus,

o

million populotion,

o bonk to

serve

5000

Collectively, they represent the
benchmork, or the torget. lf the
notionol - or regionol - finonciol
sector hos oll six pillors well
developed ond under control, it
opproximotes on ideol finonciol
sector. The f inonciol depth
connotes obility of the sector to
mobilize finonciol resources from
the economy; the f inonciol

customers, expectedly, Nigerio,
with on estimoted populotion of
150 million, would need on

breodth relotes to the obility of the
to offer severol quolity

OCCESS.

overoge of 30,000 bonks. However,
our bronch networks ore for less.
Also, substontiol number of the
bonks reside in the urbon centers os
ogoinst rurol where mojority reside.

The existence of NlB, would
improve bonking coveroge ond

sector

products ond focilitotes

substontiol choice. The willingness
of the sector to provide offordoble
quolity services is colled finonciol
efficiency indicotor, the need for o
good finonciol sector to be sofe,

stoble ond wellreguloted to meet
the regulotory sophisticotion. A
good system must hove o defined

progressive

poth known

by providing severol quolity

products (see Toble 3 for dlfferent
NIB products), hence improving
finonciol choice ovoiloble to
customers. Through zero inierest
rote ond mutuol risk shoring, the
NIB offers offordoble finonciol
products. The NIB is o highly
reguloted system. the screening
process is premised on religious
volue (existence of o shorioh
Boord) either ot the stoge of

design

or

implementotion, this strong
regulotory fromework ensures
morket disclpline ond enhonces
stobility of the system, thus,

2t

NIB

ln essence, the introduction of noninterest bonks would enhonce the

finonciol depth ond brooden
finonciol products options ond

enhonces finonciol inclusion ond
improves finonciol efficiency ond
effectiveness in the country ond in
the long run impoct positively on
notionol economic development.

os

finonciol life cycle. The existence
of NIB would possibly enhonce
finonciol depth by enhoncing
finonciol inclusion ond increosing
finonciol resources mobilizotion.
The NIB would olso enhonce
finonciol breodth of the country

product

n

effective roule to ideol
finonciol seclor in Nigerio

finonciol life cycle for it to serve os

-

is o

3.2.2 NIB ond Finonciol Stobility
The recent globol crisis wos driven

by o number of couses, omong

them is the incessont
tronsformotions in the finonciol
system colled Finonciol

Engineering (Trumon 2009),
finonciol expropriotion (systemotic
extroction of finonciol profits)
Lopovitsos (2009), the obolition of
the Gloss-Steogoll Act in .l999 (in
force since 1933), which formolly
enobled commerciol bonks to
engoge in riskier investment

bonking proctices, creoted

opportunities for bonks to trode on

their own occount ond

inodequote morket discipline, too
big to foil syndrome (Chopro 2009).
However, Chopro (2009), siddiqi
(2009) oll orgue thot the noninterest bonks exercise more
morket discipline, ond thus were

i

- -_: ._
not totolly destobilized during the

shock. Chopro (2009) finolly

due to income shock,

unemployment ond religious

copitol contribution of

the

concludes thot the non-interest
bonks ore more resilient to shocks
thon the conventionol bonks, due
to their ethicolfunding opprooch,
ovoidonce of excess leveroge

constroints.

finoncier occording to on ogreed
rotio.

3.2.5 NlBs ond ECONOMIC AGENTS

GOVERNMENT: NIB could

ond speculotive finoncing,

it moy

reguloted finonciol innovotiveness
os well os ossef-bocked finoncing
(See Moboloji20l I fordetoils).

portfolio of holding finonciol

ossets, broodens finonciol choice

HOUSEHOLD

provide

on

olternotive

ond inclusion. With it,

some

Muslims con conveniently portoke

3.2.4 NIB ond Duolfinonciol sector
in Nigerio

Nigerio is chorocterized by duol
finonciol sectors, the formol ond
informol, the formol is relotively
more stoble but hos low bonking
potronoge due to high cost ond
bureoucrotic procedures, the
lorge informol sector is less stoble

but hove few exploitotive

institutions, thus, the existence of

NlBs would provide odditionol

f

inonciol option through

its

numerous finonciol instruments.
EFInA surveV (2010) reports thot
obout 70%oI Nigerion odults hove
no bonk occounts ond 46.3% of

mole odults ore f inonciolly

excluded. This exclusion is portly

Yeor

in the finonciol sector. ln UK for
exomple, the UK Government
Support for lslomic Finonce,
occording to Lord Eddie George,
Governor of the Bonk of Englond
(1993-2003), is for two principol
reosons enhoncing f inonciol
inclusion ond business benefits to

encouroge reol sector
development. Mony of the
government initiotives in the reol
sector con be finonced of o low
cost or zero interest, but on long
term profit ond loss shoring which
would benefit both porties. A
sukuk bond for exomple os being
procticed in Moloysio London ond
other countries could help in reol
sector development for foirly long
period. The NIB through its Sukuk
(lslomic Bond) con portner with
the government to finonce

severol other government
initiotives in the reol sector on o
relotively long-term bosis.

UK.

BUSINESS/FIRM: NlBs moy
encouroge emerging smoll ond
Medium Enterprises through
mutuolrisk shoring ond promotion
of entrepreneurship. For exomple,
one of the finoncing Modes of

NIB

is Mudhoroboh, profit ond loss
where both where both the
entrepreneur's ideo ond lobour
effort is reworded olong the

3.2.6 NlBs ond SociolCopitol
Sec l6 (l) (b) of the Federol
Constitution stotes: The Stote sholl,
within the context of the ideols

ond objectives for which
provisions ore mode in this
Constltulion control the notionol
economy in such monner os to
secure the moximum welfore,

No of

Toble 1: NIGERIAN BANKING SECTOR lN BRIEF
Urbon
Rurol
Abrood Totol Finonciol Finonciol

Bonks

Bronches

Breodth

Bronches

Efficiency

ond

Low

stobility
Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

/ choice
950

12

154

4

2

r60

1970

14

263

7

3

273

I

980

20

555

r68

7

740

r

990

58

11

69

765

5

r

2000

54

1466

714

5

2185

r

939

lnterest
bosed
lnterest
bosed
lnterest
bosed
lnterest
bosed
NONE,

Regulotory

but
interest
bosed
2004
2008

89

2765

722

3492
3897

5
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Computed: From CBN Stotisticol Butletin (2008)

))

NONE
NONE

rmprovtng lmproving
improving lmproving

\"c1,-11?
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freedom qnd hoppiness of every
cilizen on lhe bosis of socloljuslice
ond equolily of slolus ond
opportunity. Thus, NlBs would
enhonce public confidence in the
sector ond promote 'equolity of
stotus ond opportunity'. This public
confidence is needed to promole
notionol economic development,
os it is o bosis of sociol copitol ond
citizen' genuine possion f or

notionol development
(potriotism.).

con be focilitoted through the
implicit mutuol risk shoring profile
of non interest bonk, where
finonciol support is equoted lo
entrepreneuriol skill, especiolly in
the Mudoroboh finoncing mode,
where the business ideo is volued
This

os much os the finonciol

contribution of the bonk. And in
cose of ony loss, individuols ore
indemnified to suffer only lobour
loss. This is in direct comporism with
the conventionol bonking system.
where the borrowers beors both
the humon ond finonciolloss, ond
thus, hove his welfore worsened in
cose of ony loss, os there is
uniloterol risk shifting rother thon
mutuol

risk shoring in NlB.

3.2.7 Non-lnlerest Bonking is sel lo
ochieve finonciol inclusion.

Finonciol lnclusion is o
constitutionol right of every citizen
ond must be respected. lt is olso o
sensible public policy. The
existence of NIB widens finonciol
choice ond enhonces finonciol
inclusion. NIB could olso reduce
copitol flights os it could creote
ovenues for o clement investment
environment with low cost ond
odequote returns.
3.3

.t.-i,/ * sIP'=t,lBER 2-

3

Non interesl Bonking ond
some Chollenging lssues in
Nigerio's Finonciol Syslem

For the NIB to fully reolize its
potentiols ond impoct more on
the economy, some of the
following chollenges hove to be
ottended to. These include well
structured regulotory fromework
on NIB to guide ogoinst obuses

ond ensure uniformity in proctices.

Americo, Switzerlond, South

The fromework should equolly spell

Africo, Morocco, Libyo etc.

out cleorly the

relotionship
between these bonks ond other
conventionol bonks. The money
morket hos to be restructured to
occommodote tronsoctions of

in o non-interest beoring
ln the some vein. the
copitol morket moy be
reononged to ollow the NlBs to

The

recent globol finonciol crises hove
mode severol countries in the
world to reconsider the proctice
of Non-interest bonking olongside
the conventionol bonks.

ossets

modes.

seek for long term ond medium
term funds ond provision of noninterest bonds would focilitote
further finonciol intermediotion.
Other chollenges include deorth
of speciolists, competition with
other conventionol bonks, poor

public oworeness, unstoble
mocroeconomic environment
stondordizotion

of

occounting

procedures etc. All these
chollenges ore however,

surmountoble, considering the
relotive importonce of this sector.

4.0

coNcLUsroN

The non interest bonking provides

on olternotive finonciol

intermediory for mobilizing ond
ollocoting resources. Through its
operotionol modolities, it
enhonces finonciol inclusion,
finonciol depth ond breodth ond
copoble of improving finonciol
ef f ectiveness ond eff iciency
which ore needed for notionol

economic development.

Becouse often such NlBs ore often
osset bocked it is more stoble less
frogile like the conventionol bonks

thot ore osset bosed. NlBs ore
ethicol investment bonking

outlets, ond enhonce mutuol risk
shoring between investor ond
bonks; this reduces osymmetry
ond focilitotes entrepreneurship
ond innovotion. ln NlBs, more
morkel restroints ond discipline ore
likely to operote.

A little coution hos to be exercised
while interpreting the onolysis of
this poper, os the poper hos only
presented o preliminory onolysis of
the role of NIB in economic
development. Some of these
potentiol impocts moy hove
contemporoneous impoct ond
other hove future effects. Thus,
enough time hos to be given for
the impoct to fully moture or
observed in the economy, due to
fewness of the number of NlBs ond
its level of development.

Furthermore, these effects con
only be hornessed if the system is
foithfully implemented ond there
is o strong regulotory fromework in

ploce to check obuses ond
orbitroriness. Due to the relotive
newness of the system (NlB) in
Nigerio ond deorth of relioble
doto, it is o bit difficult to conduct
on empiricol study in this poper;
however, this con be further
explored by further reseorch in this
oreo.
The existence of NIB only put the

country omong countries thot
offer duol bonking system, (
combining the ethicol feoture of

the NIB ond the finonciol
innovotion of the conventionol

bonking system, the existence of

the two systems would further
enhonce the potentiolimpoct of
the finonciol sector in focilitoting
economic development os the
two should be complementory
ond not substitute.

in

Finolly, NIB is on ethicol system
bosed on religious volues, with o

o

fundomentol requirement thot

momentum ocross the globe. lt is
in operotion in more thon fifty
countries in the world, including in
the Middle Eost ond some other

finonciol tronsoctions ore linked to
reol economic octivity or reol
sector development. This system
hos to be embroced in its entirety,
if NIB would contribute towords
economic development.

Though NIB is relotively new

Nigerio but hos goined

of the world like United
Kingdom, United Stotes of
ports
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APPENDIX:

Toble 2: WORLD
Country/Cenlro! Bonk

INTEREST RATE AT

Losl Meeling

A GTANCE

Current lnlerest Rotes

Previous !nlerest
Roles

Egvpt

Sept,2009

8.25%

8.s%

Soulh Africo

Oct 2010

5.s%

6s%

HongKong

Dec ,2008

os%

1.s%

lndio

July 2011

8%

7.25%

Jopon

Dec 19,2008

0.1%

03%

Koreo, Republic of

Mor, 201I

3%

2.2s%

New Zeolond

Mor, 20l

l

2.5%

3%

Toiwon

Dec 2010

1.6%

1.5%

Czech Republic

Moy,20l0

o.7s%

1%

Europeon Monetory Union

July, 2011

1.s%

'1.25%

lcelond

Feb,20l I

4.25%

4.s%

Nonroy

Moy, 201I

2.25%

2.0%

Polond

June,20l I

4.s%

4.25%

Slovokio

Mor 13,2009

1.75%

2.2s%

Sweden

Oct 2010

1.0%

o.7s%

Swifzerlond

Mor 2009

o.2s%

o.s%

United Klngdom

Mor,2009

o.s%

1%

Turkey

Jon, 201 I

6.2s%

6.s%

Conodo

Sepl,20l0

1%

o.75%

USA

Dec 16,2008

o.2s%

1.0%

12.5%

12.25%

SAR

Brozi!

Jvly,2011

Source: Goog/e July, 201I
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Toble

s/N
1

3:

NIB FINANCING INSTRUMENTS

Potentiol
Beneficiory
Households

ond

2

)t'- / - SIPIIIIBER 2irl

3

ond

Term

Meoning

Mushorokoh

A portnership controct between two or
more porties eoch contributing
copitol.Any profit or loss is shored
occording to ogreed rotio.
A profit shoring controct where one porty
contributes his entrepre neurio I eff orts while
the other provides the copitol. Profits ore
shored occording to on ogreed rotio,
while ony loss is exclusively borne by the
finoncier ofter necessory due diligence
hos been observed by the entrepreneur
A sole controct involving the bonk selling
on osset to o customer of o cost plus
morqin
Sole ond leose-bock of osset , generolly for
long term finoncing

Firms

Households

Mudhoroboh

Firms

3

Household
Empowermenl

Murobohoh

4

Firm/lnduslriol
sector
Development
Firm/lndustriol
seclor
Developmenl

ljoro

5

AND ECONOMIC AGENTS

lstisno

6

Firm/

Solom

7

Agricullurol
seclor
Government

Sukuk

A purchose order controct of ossets
whereby o buyer ploces on order to
purchose on osset to be delivered in the
future. This is useful for monufocturing/
industriol finoncing
Very useful for ogriculturol product
finoncing
lslomic Bond used for long term
government finonces ond development
proiects
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